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 The nature-culture dichotomy is perhaps one of the most critical legacies of 
anthropological thought. Nature has long occupied a position of vital importance in 
the way in which people are understood to imagine their own and others’ worlds. 
Given this, it is not surprising that nature has been employed by anthropologists as 
an analytical heuristic and, historically, as an ultimate reference point from which to 
make sense of human behaviour. Nature is, also, a concept with great power and 
rhetorical weight for the people anthropologists encounter in the field, not least in the 
Western world. Diverse examples from moral panics about genetically modified 
foods, to the spread of government-enforced waste recycling schemes, to concerns 
about ‘reproductive tourism’ show that claims about nature are never politically, 
emotionally or morally neutral. For many, notions of naturalness structure ethical 
choices, both in terms of how people live (or want to live) their lives and in guiding 
our sense of right and wrong, justice and truth.  
 In 2012, artist and designer Ai Hasegawa exhibited her award-winning piece, ‘I 
wanna deliver a shark…’ at the Royal College of Art’s Design for the Real World 
exhibition in London. The main exhibit was an anatomical model of a human uterus 
with a shark foetus inside it (Figure 1). Hasegawa explains in her own words:  
 
This project approaches the problem of human reproduction in an age of 
over-population and environmental crisis. With potential food shortages and a 
population of nearly nine1 billion people, would a new mother consider 
incubating and giving birth to an endangered species such as a shark, tuna or 
dolphin? This project introduces a new argument for giving birth to our food to 
satisfy our demands for nutrition and childbirth and discusses some of the 
technical details of how that might be possible. (Ai Hasegawa’s website, 
accessed 19th February 2014)  
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Hasegawa’s speculative design work proffers a radical rethinking of the human 
exploitation of natural resources, it razes the boundaries between species and 
presents a fundamental challenge to our ideas about motherhood. The idea of a 
woman giving birth to a shark, which she might later eat, or which might even eat her, 
pushes forcefully at the borders of the natural and the ethical. Like the papers in this 
special issue, Hasegawa’s work points to questions with enormous significance: what 
counts as (un)natural? What happens when we cross species boundaries? What are 
the consequences of playing with life and death? What are humans’ responsibilities to 
the natural world? Her work also reminds us that every scientific and medical 
innovation has a history and that often even the most challenging technologies have 
become normalised. 
 
 
Figure 1. ‘I wanna deliver a shark…’, Ai Hasegawa, 2012.  
Photo by artist, with permission. 
   
 As Hasegawa’s work viscerally reminds us, describing something as 
unnatural marks it as uncanny, dubious and even taboo. This is not to say that 
naturalness is treated as unproblematically ethical: it still has its teeth and claws, yet 
there is a strong implication in contemporary representations of nature within the 
Western world that it is, at least, fundamentally authentic. In Western epistemologies, 
nature is relationally defined, often paired dichotomously with culture, and the 
relationship between them shifts, as culture controls nature, yet nature is prior to and 
underlies culture. The relationship is not static but, rather, a continuous process of 
transformation, a changing hierarchy in which meanings shift depending on the 
formulation of control.  
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In After Nature, an analysis of kinship and nature in the late twentieth century 
England, Marilyn Strathern (1992) shows the continuous tension between nature and 
culture in modern thought, as society is framed as descending from nature but at the 
same time is different from nature because it is socialised through relations. This 
opposition is productive, as it makes both knowable: they play off one another as 
they illuminate and mask the other. This complex relationship Strathern terms a 
‘merographic connection’: domains can be part of something else, but nothing is ever 
a self-contained whole, as it can only be re-described from another perspective, 
thereby taking on, however slightly, the character of something else. Nature, in this 
way of thinking, is particularly significant because it has the capacity to act as a 
baseline or universal reference point. In contemporary Britain, nature seems also to 
have become laden with moral authority and ethical potency. For example, we are 
used to the idea that naturalness is something to be strived for, whether in selecting 
baby food or assessing beauty. This is of course a particularly middle-class 
obsession, but we would suggest that this is all the more reason to take it seriously, 
since, as Strathern also points out, the middle class dominates politics, media and 
the public sector, so their2 ideas, including about the ethics of nature, are 
disproportionately influential in mainstream public discourse.   
 In After Nature, Strathern (1992) predicted that, with increasingly minute 
interventions into biological processes, from genetics and embryology to 
pharmacology and agriculture, nature would lose its ability to ground fundamental 
claims about who we are, how we are related to each other and how we should live. 
She proposed that exposing the complexities of nature through its technologisation 
and commodification would cause it to become ‘flattened’. Nature would, in other 
words, lose its ontological and moral purchase. Meanwhile, morality and ethics would 
become increasingly individualised because of a lack of stable reference points in a 
world where biotechnology has shaken former certainties.  
 This special issue responds to Strathern’s provocative predictions by 
considering a diverse range of contemporary relationships to nature over twenty 
years after her momentous speculations. Nature is undoubtedly a polysemous 
concept with particular local, individual and contextual meanings, yet despite this 
elasticity its ability to act as an ultimate reference point seems to have become 
stronger, rather than weaker. The issue will focus on nature’s moral force and 
examine the connections and disjunctures between nature and ethics across cultural, 
species, geographic and ethical boundaries. The papers will show that, while nature 
remains an ambiguous and risky force, we are in a time in which it can still act as an 
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ultimate reference point and boundary-marker, and that it is, vitally, invested with 
profound ethical authority.  
 The papers in this collection examine how working directly with the natural 
world (re)produces specific conceptions of the natural and the ethical, as well as the 
ways in which people make competing and apparently contradictory claims on and 
for nature, sometimes within the same or geographically and culturally close 
locations. They all reflect on how an ethicised nature – that is, a formulation of nature 
which assumes it has a fundamentally ethical or good character – bears on how 
people understand themselves, their relations to others (human and non-human) and 
on the connections between people, as well as the role of a naturalised ethics in 
structuring relationships between people, the natural world and other living beings 
(see also Ingold 2000).  
The papers in this special issue examine the connections and disjunctures 
between nature and ethics across cultural, species, geographic and moral 
boundaries. They provide a comparative perspective on the varied and complex 
ways in which nature and discourses of naturalness pervade people’s lives at all 
levels, from the intimacies of familial relationships to the production and consumption 
of food, the gendered division of labour, trans-species relations, discourses of 
science and truth, perceptions of the landscape and the politics of emotion and 
identity.  
 
 
Nature in Anthropological Theory and Ethnography  
 Our understanding of the concept of nature has evolved alongside 
anthropology itself. As Kirsten Hastrup (2013: 1) has written, ‘Theoretical 
advancement in anthropology today is precipitated by new insights into the deep-
seated entanglements of natural and social, of human and non-human, and of 
organic and non-organic forms. Through such entanglements, worlds emerge 
simultaneously as empirical and analytical objects’. She describes a shift from the 
work to ‘dismantle the dualism’ of nature and society done in the 1990s, especially in 
the work of Descola and Pálsson (1996), towards actually moving ‘beyond’ the 
dualism. This attempt to move beyond the nature-culture dichotomy is epitomised by 
Philippe Descola’s recent effort to take a ‘Big-Time Thinker’ approach to this 
problem. The aim of Beyond Nature and Culture, as stated in the title, is 
commendable, but we wonder if it is really possible to move beyond any dualism 
whilst still working within its terms and we remain unconvinced by Descola’s 
proposition that a better understanding of human life lies in tracing collective 
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‘schemas’ (see Fitzgerald 2013 for a cogent critique on this and related points). 
Further, we would add that, in getting caught up in the traffic in nature between 
ourselves, anthropologists are in danger of losing sight of the ways in which ideas of 
nature evolve amongst other people (i.e. non-anthropologists), with whose ideas we 
are, after all, supposedly most concerned.   
The following review, which is not intended to be an extensive overview of 
nature as a concept in anthropological theory, but to provide the reader with a 
refresher of the extensive conversation over the last 25 years, follows three strands 
of the debates which are most relevant to the papers in this special issue: kinship 
and gender, environmentalism and human-animal relations. However, it should be 
clear that debates about nature touch most aspects of anthropological theory and 
research. Two common problems for social theorists grappling with ideas of nature 
and the natural are, firstly, the fact that nature is a powerful rhetorical resource for 
making moral and political claims and secondly, the tenacity of the nature-culture 
distinction in many folk models, both historical and contemporary.  
At the turn of the 20th century, anthropological references to the ‘natural’ 
conveyed a universalising approach to analysing the structure and function of social 
roles and relationships. This is perhaps most forcefully exemplified by the idea of a 
universal biological sexual division of labour that relegated women into caring roles 
at home and reproductive work while men dominated the public sphere of the market 
and politics. This naturalised division of labour, rooted in fundamental assumptions 
about the natural nature of sexual reproduction, structured anthropological thinking, 
so that it seemed plausible to divide social worlds into dichotomous domains of 
public/private; production/reproduction and work/home. Subsequently, 
anthropologists, including most notably David Schneider (1984) and Jane Collier and 
Sylvia Yanagisako (1987), demonstrated that the apparent universality of nature in 
anthropological analysis and the corresponding social relationships were, in fact, 
projections of specific Western knowledge practices. 
Throughout the 1990s feminist scholars actively deconstructed the 
relationship between biological universals of sex and gender, elucidating the ‘social 
construction’ of biology. Ideas that women, by virtue of biology, were geared and built 
for roles in the private, domestic and reproductive spheres have been systemically 
challenged as ethnography showed that these categories and logics do not hold firm 
across space and time (see, for example, Strathern 1980; Moore 1988).  In place of 
biological sexual difference translating into universal sex categories and roles, 
gender was no long a priori, predictable or fixed, but rather, a symbolically 
constituted social construction resulting in naturalised difference and inequality 
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(Moore 1988; MacCormack and Strathern 1980; Ortner and Whitehead 1981; 
Atkinson and Errington 1990). Gender was defined as the ‘cultural elaboration of the 
meaning and significance of the natural facts of biological differences between 
women and men’ (Moore 1999: 149). Collier and Yanagisako (1987) further 
advanced this deconstructive move by questioning the biological ‘facts’ of sex. Judith 
Butler (1990) then showed that biological sex is actually an effect of gender and that 
gender codes what we take to be the natural basis for differences between men and 
women. 
Parallel to these feminist critiques has been the emergence of the new 
kinship studies, which have drawn on ethnographic accounts of the fast-moving 
world of reproductive and other biotechnologies. New kinship studies built on the 
foundational work of David Schneider (1980 [1968]; cf. 1984), which illustrated how 
the ‘order of nature’ and ‘the order of law’ are merged in anthropological kinship 
thinking. Following on from this, and alongside the feminist critique of biological 
universals, the idea of ‘natural facts’ came to be recognised as a specific Western 
folk model. Strathern (1992) subsequently examined the many definitions of nature 
and the complex way in which it is implicated in the structure and (re)production of 
Euro-American and anthropological knowledge practices. This has led to a much-
needed examination of the substance and coding of nature, which was previously 
taken for granted (Franklin and McKinnon 2001). 
 A key development in anthropological theory in recent decades has been the 
thorough reconsideration of nature as a variable, contingent category that 
encompasses many different meanings, not just in the contrasts between Western 
and non-Western societies (Descola and Pálsson 1996; Strathern 1980), but also 
within Western societies (Franklin 2003; Franklin et al 2000; Gould 2005; James 
1993; Keller 2008; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Strathern 1992, 2003; Thompson 
2001, 2002; Tsing 1994; Yanagisako and Delaney 1994).  
Sarah Franklin (1997: 57) argues that understanding the idiom of naturalness is 
essential to grasping Euro-American cultures; this is particularly acute given the 
close connections that she identifies between anthropologists’ own ideas about 
nature and what they find in their ethnographies of other cultures. For Yanagisako 
and Delaney, nature picked up where Christianity left off after the decline of 
institutionalised religion in western European and North American societies:  
 
[W]hat was left was a rule-governed Nature, Nature stripped of its 
cosmological moorings and therefore presumably generalizable to all 
peoples. Rather than the dichotomy between the natural and supernatural, 
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what was left was “nature” vs. what man did with it – namely, “culture”. This 
move obscured the specificity of the concept of “nature” (1994: 4; see also 
Sahlins 1996).  
 
Through history and in different places, nature has had different forms, 
meanings and moral valences (see Abram and Lien 2011). But, nature does not only 
shift because of the vagaries of history – polysemy is an inherent part of its own 
nature and scholars in anthropology and cultural studies have noted the many 
meanings that it has in the English language alone (Cronon 1996; Franklin 1997: 54; 
Keller 2008: 118; Schneider 1980 [1968]; Williams 1983). As Keller (2008) argues, 
blurring nature’s sometimes disparate meanings is an inherent feature of Euro-
American thinking about this concept. In the twenty-first century, nature comes 
clothed in the vestiges of the multiple meanings it has acquired through history. We 
argue that this ability to encompass multiple meanings is important in giving nature 
its potency, and that this grows with the increasing meanings it takes on. Nature’s 
specific potency in Euro-American thinking is due to the fact that, amongst its many 
meanings, it is a grounding or baseline, and thus fundamentally knowable, but at the 
same time a transcendent and cosmological principle that is ultimately unfathomable, 
not least because of its ever-expanding meanings. 
 While anthropological attention towards nature has largely emerged from the 
study of kinship, reproduction and gender, environmentalism, and the meanings that 
nature has for people concerned about the future of the natural world, has come to 
receive attention from anthropologists (see Berglund 1998; Choy 2011; Descola and 
Pálsson 1996; Dow 2010a; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Milton 1993). This has 
occurred alongside the environmentalist movement’s increasing influence on 
Western, and to some extent global, politics, economics and culture. Scholars of 
environmentalism have shown how the contingent meanings of nature may be 
employed to support particular claims and effect specific aims by those working in 
this movement and with animals (Thompson 2002; Yearley 1993). Some scientists 
have also sought to reflect the impact of our deepening awareness of anthropogenic 
environmental change by labelling our current age as the ‘Anthropocene’ (see Latour 
2013).  
 Eeva Berglund did fieldwork with environmental activists in various projects in 
one town in Germany, providing a valuable illustration of the kind of work such 
activists do and the meanings they place on nature and the natural world. Her 
ethnography demonstrates that, rather than taking concepts such as science and 
nature as universal constants in our analysis, they should be treated as contingent 
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categories of thought that are used for particular purposes and with specific effects. 
As she says, Euro-Americans ‘mix and match nature and culture even as we struggle 
to be consistent in setting boundaries between them. We still act (and agonise) with 
nature in mind … it is upon the power that enables the establishing of those 
boundaries, that anthropologists are able to comment’ (1998: 13). 
 In the UK, at least, what was once called the green movement has been re-
conceptualised, and re-marketed, as ‘ethical living’. A turn towards conscious 
reflection on how we live our lives has emerged alongside the increasing currency of 
environmental thinking in culture and politics (see also Grove-White 1993). As 
William Cronon writes:  
 
Popular concern about the environment often implicitly appeals to a kind of 
naïve realism for its intellectual foundation, more or less assuming that we 
can pretty easily recognize nature when we see it and thereby make 
uncomplicated choices between natural things, which are good, and 
unnatural things, which are bad. Much of the moral authority that has made 
environmentalism so compelling as a popular movement flows from its appeal 
to nature as a stable external source of nonhuman values against which 
human actions can be judged without much ambiguity. (1996: 25-6) 
  
 The importance of ideas about nature and the natural world in contemporary 
life has been particularly successfully demonstrated by anthropological studies of 
relationships between people and non-human animals. The study of humans’ 
relations with other animals is as old as the discipline, not least because so many 
early ethnographies were located in communities which relied on hunting and 
subsistence agriculture to survive and theorists have long paid attention to the 
symbolism of non-human animals, as in the long-standing debate on totemism. Lévi-
Strauss’ contribution to this debate was to move it ‘toward the intellect’ in his 
suggestion that totemic animals (and plants) are ‘good to think’ (1962: 89). Particular 
groups identify themselves with specific animals not because of their economic utility, 
he said, but their symbolic and metonymic efficacy.  
 In a review of work on human-animal relations in anthropology, Molly Mullin 
(1999) notes the relationship between trends in anthropological thinking and the 
treatment of animals in ethnography. She sees the ‘windows and mirrors’ approach 
as a productive one, and makes the related point that, just as ethnographic accounts 
of Western kinship can help expose some of the underlying assumptions of 
anthropologists that have informed kinship theory, ethnographic explication of the 
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ways that people think about the other species in their lives similarly reflect the 
preoccupations of social science. So, an interest in identity politics and reflexivity in 
the social sciences along with a concurrent increase in the influence of 
environmentalist discourse has come alongside a mushrooming of attention paid to 
the relations between people and animals. 
 As Rebecca Cassidy (2002: 129) demonstrates in her analysis of human-
horse relations in England’s Newmarket racing society, animals demonstrate the 
‘flexibility’ of how people use analogical connections in the making of culture (see 
also Edwards 2000), yet they are not simply passive signifiers of human self-
obsession, but dynamic agents. She shows this in the way that ideas about horses 
both reflect and reproduce ideas about the ‘natural order’ in Newmarket. As this 
suggests, animals are not only good to think with, but also good to act with. As 
Cassidy shows, the animals that human groups identify with may be thought of as 
family at one moment and an alien species at another and such ideas can inform and 
reproduce particular ideologies about gender, class and reproduction in humans.  
 The global call to ‘Save the Whale’ was one of the earliest examples of 
environmentalist campaigning and remains metonymic of the movement, so it is a 
useful illustration of many of the key features of humans’ contemporary relations with 
non-human animals. At the advent of the whaling industry, these marine mammals 
were largely seen as economic resources to be harvested for profit. Now, although 
there are of course divergent views within the anti-whaling camps (Stoett 1997: 105; 
cf. Einarsson 1993), they are popularly seen as hapless victims of the excesses of 
human industry which we humans have an ethical responsibility to conserve and 
protect. Writing about anti-whaling views, Peter Stoett states, ‘Environmental issues 
have ethics at their heart: questions of what constitutes proper human behaviour and 
proper relations between people and nature’ (1997: 108). What is particularly 
interesting about the global Save the Whale campaign is its successful establishment 
of an ethical imperative to protect cetaceans, which has been concurrent with the 
shift from green politics to ethical living (Dow 2010a, 2010b). As with other strands of 
the environmentalist movement like organic foods and recycling, this has rested on 
the association of certain objects and actions with nature.  
 
The Anthropology of Ethics 
 Questions of ethics, morality and the good have come to prominence within 
anthropology in recent years. As James Laidlaw has put it in his recent book on the 
anthropology of ethics, ‘Everywhere human conduct is pervaded by an ethical 
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dimension – by questions of the rightness and wrongness of actions, of what we owe 
to each other, of the kind of person we think we are or aspire to be – so it is an 
inescapable part of what anthropologists study’ (2013: 1; see also Lambek 2010; 
Faubion 2011). As some of the leading figures of this movement make clear, 
however, this should not be seen as anthropology suddenly discovering ethics, but 
more a turning up of the volume on the ethical so that we are more explicit about its 
ubiquity in everyday social life. Laidlaw (2013: 2) makes a useful parallel with the 
study of gender in anthropology and expresses the hope that, like gender, ethics will 
progress from being seen as a discrete subject of enquiry or sub-discipline towards 
being recognised by the whole discipline as something that pervades all human 
thought and conduct and so should not be heuristically divorced from the rest of 
social life or studied only by moral philosophers. 
Joel Robbins (2012: para. 4) has sounded a worthwhile note of caution in the 
recent ‘ethical turn’ in anthropology by warning that if we are to make the most of it, 
anthropology ‘will need to develop some more sustained intellectual debates and 
some more established (though not necessarily compatible) theoretical positions that 
set out central issues a large number of contributors find it useful to address’. One of 
the strongest arguments of this blossoming body of literature is the point that 
anthropology is well equipped to study ethical speech and action because of its 
method and mode of enquiry. Ethnography allows us to capture the ubiquity of ethics 
in social life, as well as the complex and contingent interactions between social 
relations, moral edicts, political-economic structures and individual judgements that 
inform ethical life and self-fashioning. 
One of the major points of interest in the development of this field within 
anthropology in recent years has centred on debates about how and where to locate 
‘freedom’. Laidlaw (2002; 2013) has made a strong case for abandoning the recently 
fashionable yet rather strange and contradictory concept of ‘agency’. Drawing 
particularly on Foucault’s work on the care of the self, which has been a major 
influence in the anthropology of ethics, Laidlaw emphasises the point that, while the 
ethical forms and codes on which ethical subjects can draw are based on their 
particular cultural and social milieux, they consciously reflect on their choices and 
actions and this is, for Laidlaw, the action of freedom. James D. Faubion (2011) 
similarly makes the point that ethical subjects are in a constant process of self-
fashioning, taking up shifting subject positions, which must be constantly maintained, 
while Joel Robbins (2012) has noted the need to take account of both the ‘socially 
given’ and the ‘idiosyncrasies’ which subjects develop as part of their particular 
projects of self-fashioning.  
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Michael Lambek (2008, 2010) is similarly influenced by Foucault’s work on 
ethics, though he also draws on Aristotelian virtue ethics, from which he takes the 
concept of phronesis, which he translates as practical judgement. Lambek argues 
against the concept of freedom in favour of judgement as ‘the fulcrum of everyday 
ethics’ (2010: 26). He says that, ‘Judgment entails discerning when to follow one’s 
commitments and when to depart from them, or how to evaluate competing or 
incommensurable commitments; thus a focus on judgment transcends a divide 
between freedom and obligation, between conventional morality and charismatic 
innovation, or between performative felicity and subjective sincerity’ (2010: 28). 
Despite their slightly different takes (and this extends to where, and whether, 
they draw the line between ethics and morality just as it does to their attitudes to the 
concept of freedom), what these theorists have in common is the view that ethical life 
is not constituted by unthinking rule-following, but that subjects have the capacity to 
step back from themselves and consider what is the good, or best available, thing to 
do or say in a particular situation. On this note, we would add that another strength 
that anthropology brings to the ethical table is its attunement to questions of context, 
which broaden the focus beyond the individual out to her wider environment and 
interactions with others.  
We agree that ethics is an inescapable part of life and that there is much rich 
material to be found by anthropologists who turn their attention to ethics in everyday 
life. We also find the attention that has been drawn to ‘freedom’ and judgement in the 
establishment of this movement within anthropology to be helpful. Not only do we 
appreciate a model of human thought and action which leaves room for conscious 
reflection, but we believe that this emphasis on the complexity and contingency of 
ethics and ethical self-fashioning reflects its current interactions with nature, as 
explored in the papers in this special issue.  
 
Ethnography of Nature and Ethics in the Twenty-First Century 
In this special issue, we wish to draw attention to the ways in which ideas of 
the natural and ethical virtues can both act as grounding concepts for people’s 
decisions, thoughts and actions and to the fact that these concepts often work in 
conjunction with each other, though not necessarily in predictable ways. We 
therefore wish to provoke readers to reflect upon the rich, complex and contingent 
meanings of both nature and ethics, how they interact with each other and how they 
operate in different contexts. Given the importance of concepts of nature and 
naturalness in informing boundary-making practices, nature needs to be treated as 
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an ethnographic subject in a way that recognises its ability to shape-shift and to 
cross human borders whilst still retaining cultural and ethical weight. The papers in 
this special issue propose some ways of responding to this challenge.  
 Nature and ethics are about life and death. The papers by Faircloth, Gugganig 
and Dow all illuminate how people formulate and make sense of the creation stories 
of living things, while Reed reminds us that our greatest ethical decisions concern the 
end of life as well as its beginning. In each case, specific ideas about nature, however 
slippery and polysemous they may be upon closer examination, come to the rescue 
of people groping for ethical guidance in the face of interventions into the most 
fundamental biological processes. 
 While some are more explicit than others, each one of the papers in this issue 
deals with how we conceptualise and live with time. The social sciences of the last 
thirty years have been coloured by exhilaration at the pace at which technologies in 
the natural sciences have been moving, and the challenges that poses for end-users 
and their wider communities. Each of these papers show how novelty rubs shoulders 
with established practice in the ways in which people assimilate and/or reject 
technological innovations into their everyday lives and ethics. It is hard to know, while 
in the eye of the storm, whether we really are living in times of unprecedented 
change, but as social scientists we can at least pay attention to the complex interplay 
between nostalgic yearnings and hurried acceptance of such developments. 
Faircloth’s article demonstrates the intricacies involved in making claims on nature, 
human nature and history through the rhetoric of the ‘hominid blueprint’ for infant 
feeding, showing just what is at stake in making claims on and with nature. This is 
further demonstrated by Gugganig’s description of the different kinships and natures 
at stake in the development of genetically engineered taro in Hawai’i.  
 As work on human-animal relationships has shown, the ways in which people 
manage the natural, the ethical and the relationship between the two is structured by 
recognition and identity. Reed demonstrates that working with animals requires a 
certain ‘ontological choreography’ (Thompson 2001; see also Thompson 2002) and 
that detachment from nature and the natural world can enable denaturing or unethical 
behaviour. His paper shows the shifting moral valence of nature and the different 
regimes of value at play in how people conceptualise their ethical responsibilities 
towards the natural world.  
 Our apprehensions of nature and ethics are about making and sustaining 
meaning. Further, the rhetorical claims we make with nature are a means through 
which we can express our ethics and hence identify ourselves as ethical people. Dow 
makes this point through the example of how people think about surrogacy and 
 13 
maternal bonding. Like Reed, she illustrates the politics of small differences in her 
analysis of how people conceptualise maternal bonding while showing that, despite 
these differences, ideas of the natural continue to act as a robust source of ethical 
guidance. As she and the other authors in this issue show, even in the Western world, 
morality and ethics have not become atomised acts of individual choice, nor is it true 
to say that our values have become so ‘literalised’ (Strathern 1992) or our morality so 
secularised or individualised, that we are devoid of grounding concepts. Instead, this 
special issue works from the premise that nature – while an ever-shifting, 
kaleidoscopic concept – acts as a tenacious and powerful reference point that can 
provide the basis for moral judgements and ethical decisions, however slippery they 
appear on closer inspection.  
 We make sense of the world around us, and the other living beings within it, 
by drawing lines; marking boundaries facilitates comprehension. Yet, as the 
comparative project of anthropology suggests, interpretation often entails the crossing 
of those boundaries. Hastrup has proposed thinking of anthropology’s contemporary 
engagement with nature as ‘edgework’, by which she means not so much studying 
edgy or risky practices, as the term has traditionally been used, but instead practising 
an anthropology that ‘resist[s] institutional calculation and conceptual routinization in 
the interest of exploring new possibilities of being’ (2013: 2). This is an anthropology, 
she argues, that is generative because it works within the oscillations between 
certainty and uncertainty about how worlds are made and maintained.  
The title of this special issue refers on one level to the geographical scope of 
the papers within it, which traverse Scotland, England, France and Hawaii, but it also 
nods to the fact that each paper examines skirmishes along the borders of the 
natural, demonstrating the different ways in which their transgression can bring us 
face to face with our ethical and moral values. As Ai Hasegawa’s proposal to give 
birth to a shark demonstrates, we become most aware of borders when we cross 
them. Snaring animals, long-term breastfeeding, genetic engineering and surrogacy 
are all practices that cross quotidian borders. They force us to consider our ‘fleshy 
entanglements’ (Haraway 2008) with non-human animals, the nature of the things 
that enter and exit our bodies, the morality of our exploitation of the natural world and 
ultimately what value, if any, these borders have.  
 If, in the contemporary Western world, describing something as natural gives it 
a moral force, demarcating the (un)natural has political consequences. As Reed 
argues, green politics and animal rights are a powerful riposte to the modernist idea 
that ultimate power comes from subduing and controlling nature. The ethical decision 
to live ‘closer to nature’ can be a way of absolving oneself of the pressure to choose 
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that is the condition of the postmodern subject, or even a means of resisting 
hegemonic expectations about human motive and action. But, as Dow and Faircloth 
both show in their discussions of the naturalisation of motherhood, it can also have 
the (in these cases, unintended) consequence of reproducing normative expectations 
of gender, kinship and the division of labour.   
Ultimately, these ethnographic examples show how people in different places 
use nature to make claims, preserve hierarchies and formulate identities and it 
suggests that nature is a concept in rude health in the twenty-first century, even in the 
context of a new explicitness about choice in natural and biological connections. The 
papers here describe worlds in which nature is used to demarcate what is ethically 
(im)possible and to support truth claims in an apparently uncertain postmodern world. 
They therefore remind us to pay attention to the continued salience of nature in 
different people’s folk models, even as we may seek to move ‘beyond’ the nature-
culture dichotomy in our analyses of human social life. In her afterword, Alana Jelinek 
discusses her own encounters with nature and ethics and reflects on the ethical 
actions of relating to Others of any species. From the perspective of artist-informant 
she offers some further thoughts about the relations between nature and ethics and 
points tantalisingly towards the place of politics and religion in these complex 
connections.  
Nature is undoubtedly a polysemous concept with particular local and 
individual meanings, yet rather than becoming ‘flattened’, nature seems to retain its 
ability to act as an ultimate reference point even as is vacillates between multiple 
meanings. Franklin writes that ‘the category of the natural remains central to the 
production of difference, not only as a shifting classificatory category, but through 
processes of naturalization, de-naturalization, and re-naturalization’ (2003: 68, 
original emphasis). She argues, therefore, for an analytical approach that considers 
the ‘traffic in nature’ (Franklin et al 2000). As she says, a key feature of Euro-
American ideas about kinship, biology and nature is their ability to encompass, and 
thus constantly vacillate between, ‘given’ and ‘made’ elements of knowledge. Nature 
may have come to seem more fluid, but instead of weakening it, this ability to shape-
shift has in fact strengthened it (Franklin 2003: 68; see also Franklin 2013). The 
papers in this special issue demonstrate that it is nature’s ability to take on different, 
overlapping forms that gives it continued power. They show that, while nature seems 
to many theorists to be at ontological risk from human activities and technology, it can 
still act as an ultimate reference point and as an ethical guide in a time that has also 
been described as one of rapid cultural, technological and moral change.  
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1
 While Hasegawa states the world population (in 2012) was nine billion, it is in fact 7.2 billion as of early 
2014. 
2
 Perhaps we should say here, ‘our ideas’, since both authors are also part of this British middle class 
milieu. 
